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General Aviation (GA) is likely to be at the forefront of a paradigm change in aviation,
where the introduction of novel concepts such as Urban Air Mobility (UAM), architectures like
4−VTOL, and technologies like Distributed Electric Propulsion (DEP) are expected to make
aircraft more efficient and reduce their environmental footprint. However, these architectures
carry with them an uncertainty related to the off-nominal operational risk they pose. The
limitations and off-nominal operational considerations generally postulated during traditional
safety analysis may not be complete or correct for new technologies. While a lot of the lit-
erature surveyed focuses on improving traditional methods of safety analysis, it still does not
completely address the limitations caused due to insufficient knowledge and experience with
transformative technologies. The research objective of the present work is to integrate the
Bayesian safety assessment framework developed previously by the authors with conceptual
and 6-DoF performance models for DEP aircraft to evaluate off-nominal performance and reli-
ability using information that is typically available in conceptual or preliminary design phases.
A case study on the electric power architecture of the the NASA Maxwell X-57 Mod. IV is pro-
vided. A maximum potential flight path angle metric, as well as trimmability considerations
using a 6-DoF model constructed using available literature help determine hazard severity of
power degradation scenarios. Bayesian failure rate posteriors are constructed for the different
components in the traction power system, which are used in a Bayesian decision framework.
The results indicate that while most of the components in the traction power architecture of
the X-57 Mod. IV are compliant with failure rate requirements generated, the batteries, cruise
motors, and cruise motor-inverters do not meet those requirements.
Nomenclature
+∞ = Free-stream velocity
ℎ = Altitude
W = Flight path angle (climb)
\ = Pitch angle
q = Bank angle
k = Yaw angle
X4 = Elevator deflection
X0 = Aileron deflection
XA = Rudder deflection
g! = Left wingtip engine throttle (fraction of max power)
g' = Right wingtip engine throttle (fraction of max power)
HLP = High Lift Propulsors
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I. Introduction
General Aviation (GA) is likely to be at the forefront of a paradigm change in aviation, where the introduction ofnovel concepts such as Urban Air Mobility (UAM), architectures like 4−VTOL, and technologies like Distributed
Electric Propulsion (DEP) are expected to make aircraft more efficient and reduce their environmental footprint.
However, these architectures carry with them an uncertainty related to the off-nominal operational risk they pose. To
ensure the continued safety of the GA fleet and operations in this rapidly evolving new paradigm, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) implemented a new set of performance-based certification rules for Normal Category Aircraft in
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 23, Amendment 64 [1]. Of particular interest in this work is 14
CFR §23.2510 which requires that all equipment, systems, and installations have [1]
“a logical and acceptable inverse relationship between the average probability and the severity of failure conditions.”
It is paramount for aircraft designers to have the capability to quantify safety risk earlier in the design phases to
help mitigate avoidable surprises once the aircraft is already built. The simplest definition of safety risk in literature
generally involves quantifying it as a combination of two entities – the probability of a failure or an unsafe event, and
the severity associated with it [2]. The intent of safety assessments is to ensure that any system under consideration
poses no worse than an acceptable level of risk, with Table 1 showing allowable probability requirements for different
failure condition classifications. SAE ARP4754 and SAE ARP4761 are considered as accepted and well established
guides for performing safety assessments [2, 3], with Figure 1 giving the integration of system safety with the traditional
systems engineering + . It shows that safety and reliability requirements in aircraft design are allocated to the item or
component level following a hierarchical decomposition of aircraft functions and architecture. Safety requirements
are initially functionally decomposed at the aircraft level, followed by a flow-down of the aircraft level functions to
generate the system level requirements. The analyses conducted at these levels include both aircraft and system level
Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), Common Cause Analysis (CCA), and a Preliminary System Safety Assessment
(PSSA). In terms of the aircraft design timeline, these correlate well with the conceptual and preliminary design phases.
As the design matures, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is conducted at aircraft and system level. As the aircraft is built,
these analyses and the requirements generated are verified, thus travelling back up the ‘+’. While this work focuses on
incorporating safety analysis earlier in the design of novel system concepts, a comprehensive coverage of traditional
safety assessment tools is not considered here. Interested readers are directed to literature for a more comprehensive
coverage of the traditional safety assessment tools and methods [2, 4–8]. Similarly, readers interested in understanding
the processes, requirements, and management of artifacts for certification are directed to articles from a parallel effort
that looks at incorporating a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach to certification by the authors [9, 10].
To summarize, the current paradigm seeks to identify hazards early in the design process and percolate corresponding
qualitative or quantitative safety requirements downstream. Washington et al.[11] summarize the outcome of the system
safety assessment process as four related sets ,,Λ and $ where:
1)  is the set of = identified failure conditions 51 − 5=
2)  is the set of severities 28 assigned to each failure condition 58
3) Λ is the set of probabilities _8 of each failure condition 58 , and
4) $ is the set of failure probability objective >8 associated with 58 and its severity 28 as given by table 1
Table 1 Quantitative Allowable Failure Rate for Different Failure Conditions [12]
Assessment Level
Failure Condition Classification





<10−3 <10−4 <10−5 <10−6
II <10−3 <10−5 <10−6 <10−7
III <10−3 <10−5 <10−7 <10−8
IV <10−3 <10−5 <10−7 <10−9
The current safety assessment paradigm is not without its limitations. In the conceptual and preliminary design
phase, the existing approach of safety assessment seeks to limit the risk posed by any failure condition 58 by ensuring that
the probability of said failure _8 is less than its probability objective >8 as determined by Table 1 using severity 28 . Novel
architectures and technologies like a distributed electric propulsion (DEP) aircraft may not have discrete functional
failures, and their consequences may not be well understood. The limitations and off-nominal operational considerations
generally postulated during traditional safety analysis may not be complete or correct for new technologies. This
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Fig. 1 The System V & V diagram in the context of safety and aircraft design (Adapted from ARP4754 [3])
can considerably affect the adoption of new technologies since the knowledge required to certify these products is
unavailable due to the lack of operational experience. One solution in the traditional approach is to assign a conservative
estimate to the severity posed, resulting in incorrect unit level probability requirements (>8) in the early design process.
As Armstrong states in his PhD thesis [13]:
“Assumptions regarding the relationship between function loss and hazard severity employed during traditional Functional
Hazard Assessment bias architecture design and lead to inaccurate estimation of unit level requirements.”
The research objective of the present work is to demonstrate the utility of the Bayesian safety assessment framework
developed by Bendarkar et al. [14] on a Distributed Electric Propulsion (DEP) concept – NASA’s Maxwell X-57
Mod-IV. Preliminary and 6-DoF performance and flight simulation models have been created for the same to evaluate
its off-nominal performance and safety risk using information that is typically available in conceptual or preliminary
design phases. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. II provides some background and literature pertaining
safety analysis techniques and their applicability to the X-57, Sec. III summarizes the implemented Bayesian framework
to evaluate off-nominal performance and safety using dynamic performance models, Sec. IV provides a step by step
case study of implementing the proposed framework on the X-57 Mod. IV using some conceptual level metrics and then
trim solutions using a preliminary 6-degree-of-freedom (DoF) model followed by conclusions (Sec V). Appendix B
provides additional details on the environment used to create the 6-DoF model as well as other details that do not form
the focus of the present work but are useful for interested readers.
II. Background and Literature
Before we can discuss traditional and state-of-the-art methods to perform risk analysis, we must answer the questions:
i) "What is risk?", and ii) "What makes it acceptable?". Risk and its estimation, typically involves providing answers to
the following three questions: i) what can go wrong?, ii) how likely is it?, and iii) what is the consequence? In one of
the seminal works on quantitatively defining risk, Kaplan and Garrick suggest a ’set of triplets’ idea – where risk is
denoted by a triplet of i) scenario, ii) likelihood, and iii) consequence, to answer the three questions given above [15]. In
determining what constitutes an "acceptable risk", they pose two difficulties with the problem itself – one minor and
one major. The ’Minor’ difficulty is that risk is not linearly comparable – two different risks cannot always simply be
compared∗. The ’Major’ difficulty, which also serves as the answer to this underlying question, is that risk cannot be
considered in isolation, but only in combination with the costs and benefits of the alternatives attendant to it. Thus, once
we decide to fly, we must accept some inherent risk, with a baseline given by the risk posed by concepts and technologies
∗e.g. consider the famous Trolley problem [16–18] and the risks posed to the persons on the tracks
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available to us today. It is with this understanding that we proceed with the task of estimating and comparing (to make a
decision on compliance) the risks posed by novel aircraft concepts and architectures. For the discussion that follows,
we revert to a ’hazard severity & probability’ paradigm to assess risk and make it comparable. A hazard is typically
considered as a ’source of danger’, which combined with the likelihood of precipitating it into damage or loss, gives us
the risk [15].
A lot of research has gone into improving traditional methods of risk analysis – methods like Hazard and Operability
Study (HAZOP) [19] and extensions to Faults Trees [20] are popular. However, both of these maintain the limitations
of the traditional methods when it comes to assessing novel aircraft like the X-57. Model Based Dependability Analysis
(MBDA) explores how dependability information (hazard severity) can be synthesized from system models automatically,
and shows promise in evaluating novel technologies [21]. Safety and reliability considerations while designing an
aircraft electrical systems have been of interest for a long time [22]. Hasan et al. [23] and Hemm et al. [24] utilized
modeling and simulation tools to gain additional knowledge regarding hazard severity and probabilities while focusing
on the operational safety paradigm. Papathakis et al. [25] and Woodham et al. [26] conducted safety assessments
of novel electric propulsion technologies. However in all these, variants of traditional methods like FTA and FHA
have been utilized with subject matter expert knowledge to conduct safety assessments of novel aircraft technologies.
They still do not completely address the problem of insufficiency of knowledge and experience with transformative
technologies, and therefore share the same limitations mentioned in Sec. I.
Thus, determining hazard severity remains one of the biggest problems with determining safety risk and reliability
of novel aircraft concepts and architectures, especially since there is little historical data or precedent to inform the
analyst. In such a situation, an approach that utilizes system performance and dynamic models seems to show promise.
Dynamic probabilistic risk analysis (DPRA) was originally developed to evaluate nuclear reactor safety [27]. While
failure dynamics in the nuclear industry play out over long periods of time, in aircraft, the system transient period post
failure is a few seconds long, with two components failing in quick succession extremely improbable. Thus, stochastic
transitions due to failures can be modeled independently of the system dynamics [28]. Dominguez-Garcia et al. [28]
proposed a methodology that uses a behavioral model for system performance and dynamics with artifacts to model
component failure, along with Markov chains for modeling the different configurations (states) a system can adopt
under component failures to enable dynamic performance and reliability evaluation of fault-tolerant systems. In a case
study on a lateral-directional flight control system of a fighter aircraft, they demonstrated that using a quantitative
system behavioral model allowed the assessment of the “degree of failure” along with degraded system operational
modes [28]. In another study that utilizes system models to determine the effects of component failure on critical
functions, Borer et al. [29] evaluated two critical portions of proposed NASA Lunar Surface Systems. When physical
components were mapped to system critical functions, a direct simulation of component dependencies (power, thermal
etc.) resulted in identification of cascading failures and allowed determination of architectural features that drive system
loss probability [29]. Thus, surveyed literature suggests that multi-state reliability assessment methods that utilize
system performance and behavioral models show promise while determining hazard severity for novel aircraft concepts
and architectures. While prior work has looked at utilizing exclusively dynamic models, the present work will focus
on system performance models at the conceptual stage (static) as well as preliminary 6-DoF models (dynamic) to
characterize the response of the system to component level failures.
The literature discussed so far focuses on methods to accurately determine hazard severity, but there is another
problem with utilizing traditional approaches to characterize safety of novel configurations. Traditional methods to
compute probability, given in ARP 4761 cannot comprehensively address uncertainty in input data and models [11].
Uncertainty is of two primary types [30] – 0;40C>AH uncertainty refers to inherent randomness in the system, while
4?8BC4<82 uncertainty refers to uncertainty due to lack of knowledge. For novel aircraft concepts and architectures, the
aleatory uncertainty is large due to lack of available data, while the limited knowledge and experience available for these
aircraft results in a large epistemic uncertainty as well. A work-around for this seems to come in the form of methods like
parametric Weibull analysis that try to capture uncertainty better [31, 32]. This requires knowledge about the detailed
working of every component and may not be best suited for early design phases when such information is not available.
The next section seeks to address the above mentioned shortfalls by presenting the safety analysis framework utilized
for the present work. It intends to augment traditional safety assessment methods by allowing model-based estimation
of hazard severity and a Bayesian approach to probability of failures for novel concepts and technologies.
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III. A Bayesian Safety Framework utilizing System Performance Models
The safety analysis framework discussed in this section was introduced in prior work by Bendarkar et al. [14], and
will be summarized here for completeness.
A. Severity Assessment & Reliability Requirement Allocation
1. Extension of Continuous Functional Hazard Analysis (C-FHA)
The functional decomposition of a novel system architecture or technology is likely to remain similar to a conventional
system even if the implementation varies drastically between the two. Traditional Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA)
utilizes this knowledge to keep implementation and behavioral spaces independent while characterizing hazards [33].
Traditional FHA considers discrete off-nominal scenarios, for e.g. – 1)loss of function, 2) excess function, and
3)incorrect operation of function. However, for novel concepts and architectures like a distributed electric propulsion
(DEP) aircraft, one may have continuous range of functional degradation scenarios. As a result, it is important to
differentiate off-nominal scenarios that can result in continuous functional degradation (e.g. losing two out of 12
DEP propulsors), as against the traditional discrete loss scenarios (e.g. one engine out). Continuous-FHA extends the
traditional FHA and system safety analysis methods to consider the magnitude of function loss when assessing an
architecture or a concept [33]. Additionally, a concept like DEP may have stronger interdependence between different
functions that are not found in traditional concepts. For instance, loss of thrust for a DEP can entail losing propulsors in
different locations, which in turn can have a strong impact on lateral equilibrium.
Figure 2a provides a notional plot showing how hazard severity can be obtained as a function of continuous functional
degradation. The effect of functional degradation is computed on various safety metrics using available models for a
particular flight phase. Decision makers can then utilize this knowledge to define hazard severity curves for every case,
which can then be combined into one hazard severity curve for the function under consideration for the flight phase of
interest. This final hazard severity - function loss curve now provides a physics backed relationship between the two, as
opposed to a heuristic and case by case approach provided by traditional FHA. The continuous hazard severity results in
safety requirements that are allocated to the system level functions in terms of allowable failure rate (see Table 1).
Failures in source or intermediate components are likely to result in degradation in the system’s capability to perform
certain functions. A system model that can quantify the effect of component failure on the system level functions can
now be utilized to generate component level reliability requirements based on generated hazard severity-functional
degradation relationship. As shown notionally in Fig. 2b, if the failure of component A or B results in a 50% and 25%
functional degradation at the system level, the requirement for allowable failure rates for these components can be
generated by utilizing the inverse relationship between hazard severity and probability requirement.
2. A Network Approach to Bottom-Up Failure Analysis
The next step involves conducting a bottom-up failure analysis to determine the system level impact of component-
level failures. Allocation of failure rate (reliability) requirements to the component level can be achieved if component
failures can be characterized in terms of degradation of system level functions, since the relationship between hazard
severity and functional degradation is already established (see Fig. 2a).
If we consider a system as a network (directed acyclic graph) of components required to satisfy a function, an
adjacency matrix can be created to represent it mathematically. The reliability of such a network can then be found
using techniques available in literature [34]. Figure 3 shows a notional, partially redundant architecture of components
connecting a prime-mover  (typically energy storing or power generating component) to a terminal consumer )
that performs the system level function, along with its network representation as an adjacency matrix. In such situations,
network reliability concepts can be utilized to automatically determine the effect of failures in the prime-movers  as
well as intermediate components 1→6 on the terminal function providers ) . This is enabled through the algorithm
given in the Appendix C.
For a DEP architecture, ) may represent one of many propulsors that provide thrust, while  may represent
a power source like a battery. The failure of a single component may result in multiple propulsors failing – in such
a situation, a set of all of failures that result in unique system level effects must be constructed. Utilizing a network
approach thus facilitates the automated determination of the impact of component failures on system level functional
degradation, lending well to the proposed methodology.
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(a) Hazard severity with continuous functional degradation
(b) Allowable failure rate for the given severity curve
Fig. 2 Notional plot of the C-FHA process [14]
Fig. 3 Example network representation of component connectivity within a system architecture along with its
adjacency matrix
B. Bayesian Probability Assessment
There are two schools of thought when it comes to defining probability - the ’frequentist’ (objective) and the
’Bayesian’ (subjective). A Bayesian approach of estimating probability allows for the treatment of both epistemic and
aleatory uncertainty even when available data is limited. Kaplan and Garrick argue that when faced with insufficient
data, there is no choice but to use a Bayesian approach [15]. Instead of only using data, a Bayesian approach relies
on using information - which includes data, models, and other available information like subject matter expert (SME)
knowledge [35]. Furthermore, a Bayesian inference model can be continuously updated as additional information
becomes available. Bayesian inference techniques for safety and reliability assessment have been applied to numerous
problems in literature [36–39] and are considered mature and mathematically sound for the purpose. The utility of this
approach can be attested to when one considers that numerous industries consider these techniques standard [40–43].
Instead of a point estimate as under the frequentist paradigm, the failure rate (_) in Bayesian probability theory is
given by a distribution that quantifies uncertainty in its estimate. When available failure data (H̄) is provided, the failure
rate _ conditioned over H̄ is given by the conditional distribution as given by Eq. 1.
?(_ | H̄) = ?( H̄ |_)?(_)
?( H̄) (1)
Equation 1 gives the Bayesian posterior distritbution ?(_ | H̄) based on the likelihood of observing the data that was
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observed ?( H̄ |_) and the analyst’s prior belief ?(_), normalized over all realizations of the data ?( H̄). Note that
Eq. 1 is simply a statement of Bayes’ theorem applied to multiple independent identically distributed observations
H̄ = H1, H2, ...H=.
The likelihood ?( H̄ |_) is a function that seeks to determine the likelihood of observing the data H̄ given a value for _.
It is a statistical model used to represent the aleatory uncertainty associated with the data and the underlying physical
phenomenon [11]. In the context of aircraft design, while numerous distributions can be used to model component
failure data, the three most common distributions used are the Binomial, Poisson, and Exponential [35].
The prior distribution ?(_) captures information that is denoted by the analyst’s subjective state of belief regarding
the failure rate. Since this distribution is based on the analyst’s knowledge about the component or event, it captures the
epistemic uncertainty associated with estimating the failure rate (_) [11].
The posterior distribution provides an updated state of knowledge of the failure rate taking into account the analyst’s
subjective state of belief and available data. Certain heritage data can also be utilized by eliciting its applicability from
subject matter experts (SMEs), and averaging the posterior distributions according to the applicability of the data [35].
When there is no data available, the posterior ends up being the same as the prior. The prior’s influence on the posterior
reduces as more and more data becomes available, resulting in the posterior moving closer towards the Frequentist
estimate – thus a Bayesian framework naturally lends itself to a ’frequentist’ estimation as sufficient data becomes
available. A Bayesian approach has numerous benefits over the traditional Frequentist approach (in addition to treating
uncertainty more comprehensively) for application to safety assessment of novel aircraft concepts.
• The Bayesian posterior can be continuously updated as more data becomes available – the existing posterior is
treated as a prior for the new data and a new posterior is generated.
• A 95% posterior credible interval for _ has a 95% probability of the true value of _ lying within it [44], unlike
the more complicated interpretation of Frequentist confidence intervals†. This little fact enables us to create a
decision theoretic framework as given in the following subsection.
C. Integrated Risk Assessment & Decision Framework
At this point, assuming the hypothetical components A and B from the C-FHA example in Fig. 2b have been
allocated failure rate requirements after the end of the extended C-FHA process, it is also assumed that component
failure probability posterior have been computed using the Bayesian approach explained above. Placing the probability
requirements from extended C-FHA on the CDFs of the Bayesian failure posteriors, analysts can compute the probability
with which reliability requirements can be met. This is shown notionally in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4 Notional Integrated Risk Assessment - Probability of meeting component failure rate requirements [14]
Decision makers now need to make a decision on whether the corresponding probability of meeting requirement is
good enough to consider component B compliant with the safety requirements. In a Bayesian decision theoretic setup,
such a compliance decision regarding component B is considered an action 0
0 ∈ ,  = {2><?;80=C, =>= − 2><?;80=C}
If the true value of the compliance finding (in reality - unknown) is given by G
G ∈ -, - = {2><?;80=C, =>= − 2><?;80=C}
†A 95% Frequentist confidence interval states that if a sample of failure data were collected a large number of times, 95% of the generated
confidence intervals will contain the true _ [44]; an interpretation that is not very useful in the current application.
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then a loss function ! (G, 0) can be defined to represent the penalty to be paid if the analyst chooses action 0 when the
true compliance value is G, under available information ?(_?>BC4A8>A < _0;;>F01;4). In such a framework, the Bayesian
expected loss d(0, ?) is the expectation of this loss function ! (G, 0) with respect to the posterior failure rate, and is




! (G, 0)?(_ | H̄)X_ (2)
An action 0∗ that minimizes the expected loss given by Eq. 2 should be the action taken by the analyst, and is also called
Bayes action. The integrated framework for evaluating compliance is shown in Figure 5. It is assumed in Fig. 5 that the
configuration has been sized – this includes the weight breakdown including mass properties, geometric definitions
including wing and other areas including locations of control surfaces if any, architecture definition that includes any
redundancy considerations for the internal energy flows of the systems, any available aerodynamics and propulsion
models, and finally any available subsystem sizing details. Adequate performance models to characterize the effect
of functional degradation on safety metrics of interest are developed. These include models that can characterize the
dynamic performance of the aircraft under off-nominal operations for different flight phases – take-off, climb, cruise,
and landing. These models, that also allow the evaluation of component failures on system performance are utilized the
complete the hazard severity assessment. Combined with the decision framework, a compliance finding of the novel
architecture can be made.
Fig. 5 Proposed framework for safety assessment integrated with design of novel architectures [14]
IV. Case Study: The X-57 Aircraft
A novel configuration- the X-57 is chosen as a test-case aircraft to demonstrate the proposed method. The X-57
Maxwell is an experimental aircraft designed to demonstrate a 3.5 times aero-propulsive efficiency gain at a “high-speed
cruise” flight condition for comparable general aviation aircraft by effectively utilizing propulsive airframe integration
(PAI), made practical due to the progress made in electric propulsive powertrains [45]. To build the X-57, a Tecnam
P2006T airframe is to be modified with a higher aspect ratio wing, with two main propulsive electric motors installed
at the wingtips to power the cruise propellers. Another 12 electric motors in nacelle-pylons will power the high lift
propellers distributed across the wing leading edge. This Distributed Electric Propulsion (DEP) architecture is expected
to provide a higher dynamic pressure during takeoff and landing, while providing more efficient aero-propulsive
performance during cruise. Overall, the X-57 is expected to achieve a five times lower energy use than the Tecnam
P2006T [46]. Open-source data is available for this aircraft, making it a good candidate for studies.
In addition to the novel technologies being tested with the X-57 program, of interest in the present work are the tools
and methods used to conduct safety analysis of such transformational aviation concepts. Research in this direction
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available in literature points towards the utilization of traditional methods to assess safety [25, 26, 45]. Having multiple
propulsors, the effect of one or more propulsors failing must be considered to assess the safety of the aircraft. Assessing
the safety of the power system architecture of the X-57 will be the focus of the present work. To define and assess the
safety metrics to be utilized in this exercise, a simple point-mass energy-based performance model is utilized. A 6-DoF
simulator is then utilized for more detailed trimmability studies under off-nominal scenarios. The simulator, as well as
the open-source data used to create the aircraft model is given in the Appendices A, B.
A. The X-57 Power System Architecture and Extended C-FHA
The X-57 Mod. IV reliability and off-nominal performance determined in the present case study will focus on its
power system architecture adapted from Clarke et al. [45]. Figure 6 shows the X-57 power system network having two
main batteries, traction buses, pre-chargers, and inverters supplying 30 kW each (half of required cruise power) to the
wing-tip cruise motors. Similarly, each battery bus supplies three high lift motors on either side of the wing, providing
good redundancy. The X-57 traction power system has been designed using a combination of available standards and
best practices, since the traditional 14 CFR Part 23 and Part 25 provide little applicable guidance for electric power
systems [45]. Clarke et al. [45] also performed a traditional safety analysis (FMECA‡) on this system, including all
permutations of cruise or high lift motors failing. Since multiple failure modes of any component has the same effect at
the system level, only single-point top level failure modes of the components were considered. Their results show two
primary critical failure scenarios – (i) asymmetric thrust due to cruise motor failure, and (ii) in-flight battery fire. While
the former results in untrimmable yawing moment using the stock rudder, the latter can result in total power loss and
catastrophic structural failure. Both of these are potentially unrecoverable for the pilot. Additionally, Ref. [45] provides
a failure scenario matrix providing criticality of single component failures. These results will therefore be utilized to
benchmark the performance of the severity assessment method presented in the current work.
The function that is considered for severity analysis in the C-FHA method proposed in Sec. III is ’Generate Thrust’,
which in this case, is closely related to the function ’Generate Power’. A functional degradation scenario is postulated
next, and its effect on system level performance metrics quantified. The computation of appropriate safety metrics to
evaluate the effect of functional degradation is vital to the success of the extended C-FHA process. One particular
metric - the maximum potential climb gradient is discussed next.
Fig. 6 The X-57 Mod IV power system representative diagram (Adapted from Ref. [45])
1. Specific Excess Power and Maximum Potential Climb Gradient
The specific excess power is a widely used, energy-based metric that allows aircraft conceptual designers to gauge
an aircraft’s performance (at zero bank angle) with respect to power available to climb (change in potential energy), or
to accelerate (change in kinetic energy).
%( =










When the acceleration is zero, the specific excess power can go towards achieving the maximum potential flight path
‡Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
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While looking at the criticality of off-nominal scenarios for the X-57’s power system architecture in conceptual design,
one can consider scenarios where thrust is degraded due to the loss of power to one (or multiple) cruise or distributed
propulsors. These can be modeled as a reduction in maximum available thrust in Eq. 3. The thrust available at
a particular altitude and velocity can be computed using Eq. 25 as well as the contribution from active distributed
propulsors (see Tab. 15) provided in the appendix. The total aircraft drag is computed using Eq. 27 and Eq. 35, with a
simplified polynomial fit generated given in Eq. 5 with coefficients as provided in table 2.
 = 0 +  2! + :1! (5)
Table 2 Polynomial drag coefficients for different flap and high-lift propeller settings
Flaps Retracted Flaps Takeoff
HLP OFF HLP ON HLP OFF HLP ON
0 0.0465 0.1878 0.1692 0.3047
 0.0569 0.0433 0.0487 0.0393
:1 -0.0414 -0.0596 -0.105 -0.107
Fig. 7 Climb gradients at 44%, 58%, 88%, and 100% power available in take-off configuration with HLP On
The following discussion will focus on figures 7, 8 to determine the hazard severity (see table 1) for different power
degradation scenarios. Figure 7 shows the maximum potential climb gradient (in %, C0=(W<0G) ∗ 100) for four different
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Fig. 8 Climb gradients at 13%, 67%, 82%, and 100% power available in cruise configuration
cases of power (or thrust) degradation. To begin, when there is no degradation in power available, the X-57 far exceeds
the 8.3% climb gradient requirement posed by 14 CFR §23.2120(a)(1) at takeoff. While this requirement does not apply
to a loss of thrust scenario, it can be seen that at a degradation in power of more than 12% (% ≤ 0.88), the aircraft can
no longer maintain a climb gradient of 8.3%. We can utilize this knowledge to assign a hazard severity of ’Major’ to a
power loss of more than 12%.
Additionally, 14 CFR §23.2120(b)(1) requires the aircraft achieve a climb gradient of 1.5% at 5000 feet under a
critical loss of thrust. It was found that under take-off configuration (flaps extended, high lift propulsors On), the X-57
can attain this value when faced with a 42% degradation in power available (% = 0.58). Any greater loss of thrust
means that the aircraft cannot achieve the 1.5% climb gradient stipulated. While not dangerous by itself, this failure to
meet regulatory requirements is given a higher than normal severity rating of ’Hazardous’ in the traditional hazard
severity scale.
While defining traditional critical engine inoperative (CEI) scenarios may be challenging for novel concepts like the
X-57, this demonstrates that a critical loss of thrust may be defined by utilizing performance metrics like climb gradients,
and as will be discussed later, trimmability considerations. Conversely, the criticality of loss of power scenarios for
DEP aircraft can be estimated in conceptual design using the same performance metrics. For instance, at % = 0.44 and
below (power degradation of 56% or more), the aircraft can no longer achieve a positive climb gradient at sea level.
Therefore, the hazard severity for this condition is classified as ’Catastrophic’.
Results of similar analysis conducted for the cruise configuration (flaps retracted, HLP Off ) are shown in figure 8.
At nominal conditions (% = 1), the model predicts the X-57 to have reasonable climb performance all the way to
cruise altitude (8000 ft). Note that the maximum potential climb gradient also corresponds to the most optimum flight
condition ((!/)<0G). Quick computation provides cruise (!/)<0G = 16.24, which is close to values found in
literature, at a velocity of approximately 137 knots.
Under off-nominal scenarios, a power (or thrust) degradation of 18% or more results in the aircraft being incapable
of maintaining level flight at cruise altitude (visible in % = 0.82 contours). Since the aircraft has to descend to maintain
steady level flight at a lower altitude, this condition is assigned a severity of ’Major’.
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A power (or thrust) degradation of more than 33% results in the aircraft being incapable of maintaining level flight
at any altitude above sea-level (% = 0.67 contours). Since the aircraft is expected to be at well above 1500 feet (cruise
configuration), this condition provides the pilots sufficient time to respond and glide the aircraft to (relative) safety.
However, the pilots are left with no choice but to conduct an emergency landing, or to decelerate, descend, and activate
the high lift propellers to enable steady level flight. This condition is therefore assigned a severity of ’Hazardous’.
A traditional one engine inoperative (OEI) scenario is particularly interesting for the X-57. Excess power analysis
suggests that the aircraft is forced to enter a descent of less than 3◦ glideslope. However, this case presents an interesting
caveat in terms of trimmability that will be tackled in Sec. IV.A.3.
Finally, Fig. 8 shows that for a power degradation of 87% or more, the X-57 cannot maintain a descent gradient under
-5.2% (−3◦) at any combination of altitude and velocity. While the X-57 mission profile location has been restricted over
Rogers dry lakebed (Edwards, California) to allow for a wide-range of landing options [45], this condition is categorized
in the present work as ’Catastrophic’ for the reason that it endangers the one and only X-57 aircraft that will be produced.
This failure also potentially applies to other future DEP aircraft which may face a similar limitation.
Table 3 summarizes the results discussed thus far. It demonstrates how hazard severity can be allocated as a function
of continuous power degradation using the C-FHA method discussed in Sec. III.A.1. It is important to recognize that the
X-57’s maximum thrust available is different in the takeoff and cruise configurations due to the excess thrust provided by
the high lift propellers. Therefore, the two configurations’ C-FHA severity values need to be considered separately. The
next part of this work will demonstrate how a network reliability approach can be utilized to determine the effect of
component failures on the system level function, and help assign reliability requirements to the component level as is
notionally suggested in Fig. 2b.
Table 3 Summary of continuous power degradation hazard severity based on the W<0G safety metric
Severity Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Configuration
Takeoff 0.88 ≤ % ≤ 1 0.58 ≤ % ≤ 0.88 0.44 ≤ % ≤ 0.58 % ≤ 0.44
Cruise 0.82 ≤ % ≤ 1 0.67 ≤ % ≤ 0.82 0.13 ≤ % ≤ 0.67 % ≤ 0.13
2. Utilizing the proposed Network Approach to a Bottom-up Failure Analysis
The components of interest in the X-57 traction power system, and their connectivity are given in Fig. 6. These
include two batteries A and B and two traction power buses from each battery – TPB-AL, TPB-BL on the left, TPB-AR,
TPB-BR on the right. These TPBs supply power to pre-chargers (PC) of three high lift motors each, and supply half the
cruise requirements of the main cruise motor to the corresponding pre-chargers. The PCs control the initial power on
current supplied to the inverters while behaving as a closed circuit after reaching steady state. The inverters supply
power and control the different high lift and cruise motors. Each cruise motor thus receives half power from each battery,
while three high lift motors on each side are supplied by the same battery, providing symmetric redundancy.
In terms of the notation in Sec. III.A.2, the batteries are the prime movers , the electric motors are the terminal
nodes ) since they help fulfil the system level function of generating thrust, while all other components are intermediate
components that facilitate the connection between the two. The generated adjacency matrix was processed using the
algorithms given in the Appendix C to auto-generate a list component failures that result in different system level
failure states (in terms of one or multiple electric motors failing to receive power). Since the effect of component
failures on terminal components that satisfy system level functional requirements can be determined in an automated
fashion, component failures can be placed on the C-FHA hazard severity plots. Hazard severity is then assigned to every
component. Looking at the results, although the W<0G safety metric does not consider a cruise motor failure as critical
during the takeoff phase, it is considered hazardous in the cruise configuration. A summary result of this process is
given in table 4.
Only single component failures are explored in the present work since the probability of multiple components failing
at once is considered negligible under independent failure assumption. Note that due to symmetry of the power systems
architecture, only six distinct system level consequences are evaluated for component failure scenarios, with all other
scenarios assumed identical to ones given in table 4. For instance, cruise motor-2 and CM-1 failures can be considered
identical, Mot-01 failure is identical to any other high lift motor failing (except slight changes in yawing moments
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generated), and effects of traction bus or battery failure is symmetrically identical to other buses or battery failure as
well. While only the W<0G energy metric is utilized here to demonstrate the proposed safety method, other safety metrics
are likely to provide different results. Interested readers are directed to work by Puranik [47, 48] for a list of other energy
based metrics that can be considered as relevant for this effort. Finally, while allocating reliability requirements to the
components, it is essential that the most critical hazard severity be utilized for a given component’s failure.
The proposed extended C-FHA process for determining hazard severity may be stopped here during the early
preliminary design stage to allocate reliability requirements to system components. If additional information/ knowledge
about the design is available, this process may be extended to utilize higher fidelity models that incorporate system
dynamics to determine the effect of failures on system level functions. In the next section, such an exercise is attempted.
A 6-DoF model of the X-57 is generated to determine the trim solutions of the aircraft under off-nominal scenarios. A
full dynamic analysis is omitted in the present work due to space constraints, and will be reported in a future publication.
Table 4 X-57 power architecture unique system level failure states and severity using the W<0G metric
Failed Component
(causal factors)
System level failure states
(Power loss to electric motors)
Proportion of maximum power available
after failure (% for takeoff/cruise)
Hazard Severity
(W<0G metric)
CM-1 CM-1 %)$ = 0.84, %2AD8B4 = 0.5 Hazardous
PC-1B or Inv-1B CM-1 at 50% %)$ = 0.92, %2AD8B4 = 0.75 Major
PC-01 or Inv-01 or Mot-01 Mot-01 %)$ = 0.94, %2AD8B4 = 1 Minor
TPB-BL Mot-1,3,5 ; CM-1 at 50% %)$ = 0.75, %2AD8B4 = 0.75 Major
Battery-B Mot-1,3,5,8,10,12; CM-1,2 at 50% %)$ = 0.5, %2AD8B4 = 0.5 Hazardous
Battery-B (fire) Mot-[1-12]; CM-1,2 %)$ = 0.0, %2AD8B4 = 0.0 Catastrophic
3. Trimmability considerations using a Preliminary 6-DoF Model
The present work leverages the DELPHI framework developed at the Aerospace Systems Design Lab as the primary
simulation environment. A preliminary 6-DoF model of the X-57 was developed inside DELPHI by using open source
data available from various sources. Details regarding the framework (Appendix A) and the development of the
X-57 model (Appendix B) are provided in the appendix for interested readers. DELPHI allows the explicit definition
of each individual high lift propulsor, along with its thrust, drag, moments, and mass properties applied first to its
individual local axis, and transformed to the aircraft axis (Appendix B..1, B..2, B..3). The aerodynamic properties and
stability/control derivatives are extracted from openly available data where applicable, or generated using a vortex lattice
method otherwise (Appendix B..4). Overall, the generated model allows simulating the aircraft for any permutation of
high lift propulsors and/or cruise motors active, for any permutations of aircraft states and environmental conditions.
At its heart, the model computes the total forces and moments generated by each explicitly defined cruise / high lift
propellers and any aerodynamic surfaces about the CG of the aircraft. Finally a trim algorithm proposed by Marco et
al. [49] that utilizes a minimization technique to determine a trim solution for any input combination of aircraft state,
control deflections, environmental conditions, and propulsive state is utilized with the 6-DoF model. The trim objective
is to match the mission +∞, ℎ, while maintaining wings level (q = 0) and maximizing W.
Table 5 shows the results of trim analysis on different failure states. The bank angle (q) was forced to remain zero
for all of these solutions, except one as indicated in the configuration column. Three different mission segments were
considered in particular based on mission profiles suggested by Schnulo et al. [50, 51] (with some exceptions) – i)
Takeoff configuration (HLP On, Flaps 30◦) at 50 feet and 1.2+(1 or 69.6 knots, ii) HLP On, Flaps 0◦ at 1500 feet and
83.5 knots, and iii) Cruise configuration at 1500 feet and 105 knots.
Under a failure scenario where the left cruise motor cannot provide any thrust, the aircraft can still attain approximately
a 3% climb gradient with almost maximum rudder deflection. However, if the failure occurs at 1500 feet with the
aircraft at 83.5 knots, no trim solutions were found with the climb gradient greater than −5.6% and maximum rudder
deflection. This condition therefore drives the reliability requirement for the cruise motor by assigning a severity of
’Hazardous’ to its failure. It is interesting to note that while conceptual studies suggest that the rudder has enough
control authority to maintain the second cruise motor at maximum of 50% thrust in a cruise motor our scenario, present
results indicate that the aircraft is trimmable with a 87% throttle setting on the right motor in the cruise configuration at
105 knots and a descent gradient of approximately −3%
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Table 5 X-57 unique system level failure states and severity using trim solutions
Failed Component Failure State




















Takeoff 69.6 50 2.97 2.89 -2.48 -3 1 -15.6 0 0.57
HazardousHLP ON Flaps 0 83.5 1500 -5.6 -0.32 -2.37 -5 1.26 -15.7 0 0.70





Takeoff 69.6 50 6.03 4.6 -2.52 -3 1 -15.81 0.5 0.76
MajorHLP ON Flaps 0 83.5 1500 -2.37 1.74 -2.42 -5.16 1.3 -16 0.5 0.85





Takeoff 69.6 50 9.98 7.34 -0.94 -3.06 0.4 -5.96 0.9 0.9





Takeoff 69.6 50 1.4 3.07 -2.5 -2.97 1.18 -16.0 0.5 0.58
HazardousHLP ON Flaps 0 83.5 1500 -3.5 3.2 -2.36 -5.68 1.57 -15.77 0.5 0.79
Cruise 105 1500 -1.05 5.97 -1.56 -5.0 1.35 -15.45 0.5 0.90






Takeoff 69.6 50 -1.17 4.48 0 -3.35 0 0 0.5 0.5
Catastrophic
HLP ON Flaps 0 83.5 1500 -6.3 4.1 0 -6.35 0 0 0.5 0.5





Takeoff 69.6 50 -9.3 4.56 0 -6 0 0 0 0
CatastrophicHLP OFF Flaps 30 83.5 1500 -7.98 -0.91 0 -3.82 0 0 0 0
Cruise 105 1500 -7.34 2.43 0 -5 0 0 0 0
A slightly less severe failure is when either of prechargers or inverters supplying the cruise motors fail. In such
a situation, the aircraft maintains 50% power (thrust) from one cruise motor while the other is free to operate at any
power setting. The X-57 can maintain a climb gradient of over 6% just after takeoff in this situation, but has to make an
emergency landing if this occurs during any other mission segment. Therefore, this condition is assigned a severity of
’Major’.
When one of the distributed propulsors lose power (near the wingtip is more critical than near the fuselage), the
aircraft can continue to climb after takeoff with little effect on its performance. At 83.5 knots and 1500 feet though, the
climb gradient was found to be rather limited. This was found to be more a limitation of the high lift propeller thrust
dropping with velocity, than an effect of the failure. Lower velocities were found to improve the climb performance at
1500 feet. Thus, a severity of ’Minor’ feels justified for this situation.
Losing one of the four traction power buses (B-Left in this instance) was found to have a severity of ’Major’ in the
conceptual stage (see Sec. IV.A.1). However, under a trim analysis, this failure is found to afford a maximum trimmable
climb gradient of just 1.4% at takeoff. Additionally, if this failure occurs at higher velocities, the aircraft can be forced
to descent or to dump excess kinetic energy to attain steady level flight. The conceptual analysis given in Sec. IV.A.1
suggested the critical loss of thrust (14 CFR §23.2120(b)(1)) to be defined at a power degradation scenario of 42%.
However, as can be seen in table 5, the aircraft is barely trimmable with a loss of traction power bus (25% power
degradation) with almost maximum rudder deflection as well as a non-zero bank angle. No trim solutions were found
for this condition with q = 0◦. Due to the preceding arguments, this condition is assigned a severity of ’Hazardous’.
Finally, while conceptual level analysis (see Sec. IV.A.1) determined that the aircraft could takeoff and climb with a
battery failure, trim analysis could find no solution for the aircraft to do so in any of the evaluated mission segments.
In fact, if a battery fails right after takeoff, the aircraft was found to trim with a maximum climb gradient of -1.7%.
Therefore, the severity of this failure state is escalated to ’Catastrophic’.
A battery fire was already considered catastrophic by Ref. [45] and from Sec. IV.A.1. Trim analysis merely confirms
this result with a descent gradient of -9.3% just after takeoff!
We now have hazard severity assigned for failures of all the different components given in Fig. 6. The corresponding
failure rate requirements for the X-57 can be obtained from Assessment Level II (≤ 1 pax., multi-engine) in Table 1.
The next section will look at determining component failure rates using a Bayesian probability approach and utilizing
the loss function for compliance assessment.
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B. Bayesian Probability Estimation
The probability distribution of component failures is evaluated using a Bayesian approach. For all components in
Fig. 6, a Poisson likelihood model is assumed since failures generally occur during operation with the number of failures
and corresponding operating time being the information documented [35]. A prior is selected based on an analyst’s
subjective bias about the component failure rate. In the present work, an initial Jeffry’s non-informative conjugate prior
is assumed which is updated using weighted historical data to generate an analyst’s prior. For Poisson likelihood models,
a Jeffry’s non-informative conjugate prior is a Gamma distribution with shape U = 0.5, and rate V = 0. Since a Gamma
prior is conjugate to the Poisson likelihood, the posterior also takes the form of a Gamma distribution [35]. In a gamma
distribution used for failure analysis, the shape parameter U can be interpreted as the number of failures, while the rate
parameter V can be interpreted as the number of hours of operational experience with a component. Thus, high value of
V can be interpreted as having a lot of operating hours experience, while lower value indicates a lack of experience and is
likely to result in a much wider spread in the posterior distribution. Similarly, higher U values for a given rate parameter
means a component is likely to have higher failure rates. Recent data sources are used next to update the analyst’s prior
to get a component’s failure rate posterior. In sources where point values are provided for failure rates, Dezfuli et al. [35]
provide a method to convert these to likelihood estimates, which are then used here to reach a posterior distribution.
1. Battery Posterior
An analyst’s prior is constructed by updating a non-informative prior with historical data [52, 53] weighted at just
10% applicability since a lot of the historical data is not for Li-ion batteries.
#>= − 8= 5 >A<0C8E4 %A8>A : _?A8>A ∼ 0<<0(U = 0.5, V = 0) (6)




=0;HBC %A8>A : _?A8>A | H̄ ∼ 0<<0(U = 0.5 + ΣH8 , V = 0 + ΣC8)
: _?A8>A | H̄ ∼ 0<<0(U = 11.45, V = 3966800) (8)
Eq. 12 can now be used as an analyst’s prior. Data available for lithium ion batteries includes a recent NASA report [54]
that suggested using 9.3 failures per million hours. Additionally, Boeing 787 reported two battery safety events in
about 104000 combined flight hours of battery operation (2 batteries per aircraft, 52000 flight hours) [55], while
NPRD-2016 [56] provides 8 failures in 2.6735E5 hours of operation for battery packs. This results in the following
battery failure rate posterior:
=0;HBC %A8>A : _?A8>A ∼ 0<<0(U = 11.45, V = 3966800) (9)
!8:4;8ℎ>>3 : H8 |_ ∼ %>8BB>=(_C8 , H8) (10)
%>BC4A8>A : _?>BC4A8>A | H̄ ∼ 0<<0(U = 30.75, V = 5338150) (11)
2. Electric Motor Posterior
Similar to a battery, an analyst’s prior is constructed by updating a non-informative priorwith historical data [52, 53, 57]
with a 10% weighting since it includes data for old electric motors.
=0;HBC %A8>A : _?A8>A | H̄ ∼ 0<<0(U = 26.15, V = 1.24177) (12)
Ref. [54] suggests using 9.24 failures per one million hours. Ref. [58] provides a failure rate of 6.6E-5 per flight hour
for three-phase electric drives(applied with a weight of 10x), while NPRD [56] provides additional failure rates of
7.23887E-5 and 3.9586E-5 per hour. The posterior is given by:
%>BC4A8>A : _?>BC4A8>A | H̄ ∼ 0<<0(U = 41.39, V = 15446550) (13)
3. Motor Inverter Posterior
An analyst’s prior is constructed by updating a non-informative prior with historical data [52] weighted 10% as
before.
=0;HBC %A8>A : _?A8>A | H̄ ∼ 0<<0(U = 4.5, V = 286940.5) (14)
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Ref. [54] suggests using 4.75 failures per million hours. Ref. [58] provides a failure rate of 1.5E-4 per flight hour
(applied with a weight of 10x) for electronics related to three-phase electric drives. The final posterior is:
%>BC4A8>A : _?>BC4A8>A | H̄ ∼ 0<<0(U = 14.25, V = 1345800) (15)
4. Traction Power Bus Posterior
An analyst’s prior is constructed by updating a non-informative prior with historical data [52, 53] weighted 10% as
before.
=0;HBC %A8>A : _?A8>A | H̄ ∼ 0<<0(U = 0.85, V = 8, 467, 600) (16)
Note that this prior suggests that the analyst believes an electric bus is likely to fail less than once in over 8 million
hours! NPRD [56] data includes zero failures for 1363267 hours of operating experience for electric buses. Together,
the posterior is:
%>BC4A8>A : _?>BC4A8>A | H̄ ∼ 0<<0(U = 0.85, V = 9830867) (17)
5. Pre-Charger Posterior
Failure data for a pre-charger was not found readily available in literature by the authors. However, upon closer
inspection (as a Bayesian analyst may have to do to determine the prior), a pre-charger typically incorporates a resistor
and a contactor to manage a sudden rush of current from damaging the inverter circuit. An analyst’s prior is therefore
constructed by updating a non-informative prior with historical data for the two components taken in series [53, 57]
weighted 20% for the connector switches, and 100% for the resistor.
=0;HBC %A8>A : _?A8>A | H̄ ∼ 0<<0(U = 5.62, V = 1000000) (18)
Since no data was found for pre-charger failures, the prior becomes the posterior (an enabling feature of Bayesian
probability theory):
%>BC4A8>A : _?>BC4A8>A | H̄ ∼ 0<<0(U = 5.62, V = 1000000) (19)
Fig. 9 Component failure rate: Bayesian posterior distributions pdf
C. Making a Compliance Assessment
Combining table 5 with table 1 for an assessment level II (≤ 1 pax, multiengine) X-57 airplane provides us with
component failure rate requirements. Minor, Major, Hazardous, and Catastrophic failures must have a failure rates
≤ 10−3, ≤ 10−5, ≤ 10−6 and ≤ 10−7 per flight hour respectively. With the component level reliability (allowable failure
rate) requirements now available, and failure rate posteriors available from Sec. IV.B, the Bayesian decision framework
described in Sec. III.C is now utilized to determine compliance finding. Table 6 gives a simplified loss function to
be used in the present work. The rational behind this loss function is as follows [14]: (i) Finding a component to be
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compliant when in fact it is not can be a costly mistake and is therefore penalized the highest, (ii) Finding a component
to be non-compliant when in fact it is compliant, while undesirable, is not as undesirable as the previous case, and is
therefore penalized to a lesser extent, (iii) Finding a component to be (non-) compliant when it is in fact (non-) compliant
is desirable, and is given a negative score to indicate a negative loss (desirable). The loss function considered here is
merely an example and can be customized by decision makers as needed in order to better suit their purpose.
Table 6 Loss function ! (-, 0)
True State Decision Action 0
- 01 = {><?;80=C} 02 = {#>= − ><?;80=C}
-1 = {><?;80=C} -2 1
-2 = {#>= − ><?;80=C} 4 -2
The Bayesian expected loss given by Eq. 2 gets simplified because of the loss function provided by Table 6 to give,
d(01, ?) = ! (-1, 01) · ? + ! (-2, 01) · (1 − ?) (20)
d(02, ?) = ! (-1, 02) · ? + ! (-2, 02) · (1 − ?) (21)
Where ? = ?(_?>BC4A8>A ≤ _A4@) is the probability of the component meeting its requirements computed using the
posteriors and are given in Table 7. As stated in Sec. III.C, the minimum of the expected loss given by equations 20-21
should inform the compliance action to be taken by the analyst. Note that due to the linear nature of the expected loss
function, a simple analytical simplification tells us that an action 01 = ><?;80=C will be taken when ? ≥ 0.857, while
action 02 = #>= − ><?;80=C will be taken by the analyst otherwise. However, the expected loss provided by Eq. 2
allows for great flexibility in defining the loss function to suit the analyst’s needs, and is also much more intuitive in
terms or penalizing or rewarding compliance decision actions that reflect the true state.
Table 7 Probability of meeting failure rate requirements
Component Battery-B TPB-BL CM-1 Inv-1B PC-1B Mot-01 Inv-01 PC-01
?(_?>BC4A8>A ≤ _A4@) 0 0.99997 0 0.45028 0.94999 1 1 1
Table 8 Expected loss due to available decision actions
Component Battery-B TPB-BL CM-1 Inv-1B PC-1B Mot-01 Inv-01 PC-01
d(01, ?) 4 -1.99982 4 1.29832 -1.69994 -2 -2 -2
d(02, ?) -2 0.99991 -2 -0.64916 0.84997 1 1 1
Decision Action 02 01 02 02 01 01 01 01
Table 8 gives the expected loss for the decision actions 01, 02 for the different components of interest in the X-57
power systems architecture denoted by Fig. 6. The decision action simply minimizes the loss function, and is provided
for each component. For the X-57 Mod-IV architecture of interest in the present case study, the main batteries, cruise
motors, and their inverters were found to be non-compliant with the safety requirements generated. The cruise motor
pre-chargers, traction power buses, and the distributed high lift propulsor system components – motors, inverters, and
pre-chargers were all found compliant with the allocated reliability requirements.
V. Conclusions
A Bayesian safety assessment framework that can address some of the problems faced by traditional methods
while dealing with novel architectures and technologies was proposed. To demonstrate its utility, the proposed method
was implemented in a case study on the X-57 Mod.IV. Continuous functional hazard assessment was applied to the
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traction power system using the maximum potential flight path angle metric to generate hazard severity curves as a
function of power (thrust) degradation scenarios. A network approach to bottom-up failure analysis provided the effect
of component failures on the system function of interest (Generate Power). Combining the two resulted in allocation
of reliability requirements directly to the component level. To take it one step further, a preliminary 6-DoF model of
the X-57 was created using the in-house DELPHI framework to perform trimmability analysis on the different unique
off-nominal scenarios. These identified battery failure as a catastrophic scenario, with loss of cruise motor or the
traction power buses as the next most critical (Hazardous). Bayesian failure rate posteriors were computed using a mix
of vintage data to generate priors, and recently available data to inform the likelihood. Finally, a Bayesian decision
theoretic framework was utilized to determine compliance finding of the different components of the X-57 traction
power system. While most components were found to be compliant with failure rate requirements, the main batteries,
cruise motors, and cruise motor-inverters were found to be non-compliant in the process.
It is important to pause here and acknowledge the numerous places where choices made by the authors can impact
the results presented above. The use of AVL for computing lateral aerodynamic and control derivatives, while enabling
for early design stages, is likely to introduce error into the results of trim solutions under off-nominal situations. It
is used here as a good first guess at these parameters in early preliminary design. Similarly, the sensitivity of the
results to numerous other modeling assumptions can be considered in the future. The component failure rate posteriors
generated using Bayesian probability theory are by definition, subjective. Subject matter experts (SMEs) may come
up with different posterior distributions – in fact, that is the intent and enabling feature of a Bayesian approach.
Finally, the simplified loss function used in the present work seeks to demonstrate the value of utilizing a Bayesian
decision theoretic framework for compliance finding. Once again, SMEs are free to define their own loss functions
for compliance assessment. The idea of the present work is to demonstrate the value of the proposed approach in
enabling a physics-based and mathematically robust approach to safety risk assessment of novel concepts, architectures,
and technologies. Analysts may use the proposed framework with their own performance analysis tools, failure rate




The flight dynamics simulation environment used in this work is the Dynamic Environment for Loads Prediction
and Handling Investigation (DELPHI) [59–61] framework developed at the Aerospace Systems Design Lab. DELPHI is
developed as an object-oriented python code which can accept any aircraft model, any desired maneuver, and simulate
the flight dynamics. A high-level view of DELPHI is shown in Fig. 10.
Maneuver Maneuver command
Time marching
ti , i = 0, ... , tf
~x at ti
~u at ti − ∆t
~x at ti
Controller ~u at ti
~x ,~u time history Vehicle ~x ~x ,~u ~x ,~u ~x
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~x at ti + ∆t Integration
Fig. 10 DELPHI framework
A desired maneuver can be specified in the Maneuver block. The Controller block compares the desired maneuver
to the current state of the aircraft and produces a control vector ®D. The control vector specifies all control surface
deflection and throttle settings on the vehicle. The Vehicle block contains within it the mass properties, aerodynamics
and propulsion. Given the current state vector, ®G, and control vector ®D, the vehicle block calls appropriates methods
to compute the loads due to gravity, aerodynamics and propulsion. The net loads, ®& ®", are sent to the Equations
of Motion block which computes the time derivative of the states vector, ®¤G. ®¤G is integrated forward in time using an
appropriate time-integration scheme to obtain the states vector at the next time step, ®G at C8 + ΔC. The entire loop is
time-marched till the final time C 5 is reached.
The Vehicle block is implemented such as to allow the user to provide an arbitrary number of aircraft control surfaces
and propulsion devices. Flexibility is offered to allow the data for propulsion and aerodynamics to come on any source-
be it simple look-up tables, or function calls to an analysis code.
The equations of motion are cast about a fixed reference point O rather than the CG. This enables, for instance, the
dynamics of a moving CG (e.g., due to decreasing fuel mass or fuel transfer) to be modeled. The force and moment
equations in vector form are given below:
®C>C0; = <
( ¤®+0 + ®l × ®+0 + ¥®A6 + ¤®l × ®A6 + 2 ®l × ¤®A6 + ®l × ( ®l × ®A6)) , (22)
®"C>C0; = ¯̄ ¤®l + ®l × ¯̄l + < ®A6 ×
( ¤®+0 + ®l × ®+0) , (23)
where ®A6 is the position vector running from O to the center of gravity (CG) of the aircraft, ®+0 = {D, E, F}) the velocity
of the reference point O, ®l = {?, @, A}) the angular velocity of the aircraft, and ¯̄ the mass moment of inertia matrix of
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the aircraft about O. The more specific case where the reference point O coincides with the CG can be obtained by setting
®A6 = 0 in the above. Kinematic relationships are used to obtain the derivatives of the Euler angles q, \, and k from the
angular rates ?, @, and A , and also derivatives of the position G0, H0, and I0 of the reference point O from the velocities D,
E, and F. The resulting system of 12 nonlinear ordinary differential equations (in D, E, F, ?, @, A, q, \, k, G0, H0, I0) for
six degrees-of-freedom rigid body motion is numerically integrated to obtain the motion history of the aircraft during
the maneuver.
The environment has been validated by simulating 14 CFR Part 25- Subpart C specified maneuvers: the checked-pitch
maneuver, the rudder-kick maneuver, and the rolling maneuver for a representative business jet aircraft [59, 61]. Consider
the checked-pitch maneuver. Sample results for flight condition ℎ = 9144m and " = 0.75 are shown below. Fig. 11a
shows the 2.5g pull-up maneuver, and Fig. 11b shows the 0g push-down maneuver.
As seen in Fig. 11a, the maneuver starts at 1g trim condition. The trim elevator deflection is seen. After 1 second,
the maneuver is initiated by deflecting the elevator up (negative) to lower the lift produced, and hence pitch the aircraft
up. The deflection is such that the load factor reaches 2.5. The 0g push-down maneuver has a similar behavior, but with
the elevator deflected down (positive) to pitch the aircraft down.





































































(a) 2.5g pull-up maneuver



































































(b) 0g push-down maneuver
Fig. 11 Checked-pitch maneuver
B. X-57 Aircraft Model
An X-57 aircraft model consisting of geometric data, mass properties, propulsion, and aerodynamics was built using
open-source data available. The subsequent sections describe these individually.
1. Geometry
Geometric details of the X-57 are obtained from the publicly available OpenVSP model provided by NASA [62].
Tables 9, 10, and 11 give the geometric details of the wing, stabilator, and vertical tail respectively.
2. Mass Properties
The mass properties of the X57 are built-up from component mass properties. Each cruise motor is assumed to have
a mass of 117 lbs, while each high-lift motor is assumed to have a mass of 15 lbs [63]. The locations of the motors are
obtained from the OpenVSP model and are given in Table 14. The battery is assumed to be located at the wing quarter
chord and to have a mass of 860 lbs [63]. Procedures and equations provided in Ref. [64] are utilized for computing
inertia properties of the wing, empennage, and the fuselage. The component mass build-up is given in Table 12, and the
net aircraft mass properties are given in Table. 13.
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Table 9 X57 wing geometric specifications
Parameter Value Unit
Planform area- (F8=6 9600.048 in2
Wingspan- 1F8=6 379.56 in
Reference chord- 2F8=6 25.56 in
Aspect ratio- 'F8=6 15
Incidence angle 2 deg
Table 10 X57 vertical tail geometric specifica-
tions
Parameter Value Unit
Planform area- (EC 3021.28 in2
Span- 1EC 63.82 in
Reference chord- 2EC 56.69 in
Leading edge sweep 37.45 deg
Table 11 X57 stabilator geometric specifications
Parameter Value Unit
Planform area- (BC01 3793.73 in2
Span- 1BC01 123.81 in
Reference chord- 2BC01 30.64 in
3. Propulsion
The engine locations relative to the CG (and the flight dynamics reference point about which the EoMs are cast) is
given in Table 14. There are two types of motors:
1) Cruise motors at the wingtip
2) Six high-lift motors distributed along each side of the wing
The wingtip motors are controlled by changing the throttle g. The throttle setting changes the RPM of the motors
linear from minimum value of 0 to a maximum value of 2500. The RPM l is given by:
l = l<8= + g(l<0G − l<8=) (24)
The diameter of the propeller 3 is 4 feet, and the thrust coefficient is 3.77 × 10−8. The thrust produced by the motors is
given by:
)F8=6C8 ? = ) dl
234 (25)
where d is the density of the air. The dependence of the thrust on the altitude at which the aircraft is flying is taken into
account through the density. It is assumed that there is no dependence of Mach number on ) .
The high-lift motors are not controlled by throttle. They are either on or off. When on, the thrust they produce
depends on the equivalent airspeed of the aircraft as given in Table 15. Above 93 KEAS, they do not produce any thrust.
4. Aerodynamic Build-Up for the X-57
The aerodynamics is broken into two parts- longitudinal, and lateral aerodynamics. The basis of the longitudinal
aerodynamic model for this work are regressions which provide aerodynamic coefficients in the wind frame. The
regressions are obtained by digitizing the data in Deere et al. [46] and fitting polynomial linear regressions through
the data. A component build-up approach is used where the aerodynamic coefficients of the entire aircraft is found by
adding contributions of each component- wings, nacelles, pylons, stabilator, fuselage, and vertical tail. The aerodynamic
coefficients must be a function of the following:
• States
– Angle of attack: U
– Sideslip angle: V
– Angular rates: ?, @, A
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Table 12 Mass build-up of X57 aircraft
Parameter Value Unit
2 × cruise motor 106.14 kg




Landing gear 61.15 kg
Wing 152.88 kg
2 × pilot 170 kg
Misc 135.7 kg
Total 1360.77 kg









Table 14 X57 right engines locations relative to CG. The values are given in the flight dynamics body-fixed
reference frame (x-forward, y-right, z-down). All values are in inches
Engine x offset y offset z offset
Wingtip propulsor 13.01 189.74 -0.958
Distributed propulsor 1 15.39 34.98 4.2
Distributed propulsor 2 13.41 57.66 4.2
Distributed propulsor 3 15.39 80.34 4.2
Distributed propulsor 4 11.92 103.02 4.2
Distributed propulsor 5 13.90 125.7 4.2
Distributed propulsor 6 10.41 148.38 4.2
• Controls
– Stabilator incidence angle: XB
– Trim-tab deflection angle: XCC
– Flap deflection angle: X 5
– Aileron deflection angle: X0
– Rudder deflection angle: XA
– High lift propeller blowing (boolean)
The lift coefficient is found as:
! (U, XB , XCC , X 5 ) = !blower
# of blowers ON
12




Note: it is assumed that the lift coefficient is not affected by the sideslip angle. The drag coefficient is similarly found as:
 (U, XB , XCC , X 5 ) = blower
# of blowers ON
12




The moment coefficient is found as:
< (U, XB , XCC , X 5 ) = <blower
# of blowers ON
12





Table 15 High-lift motors thrust dependence on +(
Velocity (KEAS) 0 17 24 31 38 58 64 70 76 84 93
Thrust (lbf) 0 10 20 30 40 50 40 30 20 10 0
Table 16 Estimated lateral aerodynamic coefficients of the X57
V ? A X0 XA
. -1.4487 -0.0883 0.2772 0.0026 0.181
= 0.2678 0.0321 -0.257 0.0039 -0.1408
; -0.0131 -0.6742 0.0569 0.2149 0.0143
To the best of the authors’ knowledge there is no publicly available lateral aerodynamic data for the X57. The Vortex
Lattice Method (VLM) is low-fidelity method for the pressure field approximation using linearized potential flow. In the
VLM, the lifting surfaces are model as discretized vortex panels following Biot-Savart Law and Kutta-Joukwski Theory,
while the non-lifting bodies are model as sources/sinks or doublets to enforce the non-penetrating condition. Due to its
nature of linearization, the VLM is able to quickly compute the stability and control derivatives. An open-source vortex
lattice method software, AVL [65], is used to obtain the lateral aerodynamic coefficients. The authors acknowledge
the limitations posed by a linearized estimation method while ignoring the effects of swirl and sidewash generated by
multiple high-lift and wingtip propellers. However, the intent of the present work is to generate a quick estimate by
utilizing data available in early-preliminary design stages. For that reason, the results generated were found adequate for
the purpose of the present research. The lateral aerodynamic coefficients from AVL are given in Table 16. The net
lateral coefficients are found as:
. = .V V + .? ?̂ + .A Â + .X0 X0 + .X4 X4 + .XA XA (29)
; = ;V V + ;? ?̂ + ;A Â + ;X0 X0 + ;X4 X4 + ;XA XA (30)










Finally, the aerodynamic loads are computed from the coefficients as:
! = @̄(,! (34)
 = @̄(, (35)
. = @̄(,. (36)
; = @̄(, 1; (37)
< = @̄(, 2< (38)
= = @̄(, 1= (39)
The above loads are obtained in the wind-axis and are rotated to the body-fixed axis frame before being used in the
equations of motion.
C. A Network Approach to Bottom-Up Failure Analysis
For a given system represented as a network of prime movers (nodes ), terminal components that satisfy system
function () ) and intermediate components, Algorithm 1 explains how system failures states can be obtained if any
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component (8) fails:
Algorithm 1: Generate a set of terminal components that fail if any system component fails
Result: Set of ) that fail if component 8 fails
Generate system adjacency matrix ";
Set  = ";
Set  (8, :) = 0 % set out-going network connections to 0;
Initialize C = zeros(size(M));
Initialize jj = 1;
while  9 9 is not zero do
C = C +  9 9 ;
jj = jj+1;
end
truncate C to keep rows corresponding to all  and columns corresponding to all ) and assign to T;
Initialize kk = 1;
while :: ≤ numCols in ) do
if max(T(:,kk)) == 0 then








[1] FAA, “Revision of Airworthiness Standards for Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter Category Airplanes,” Federal
Register, online: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-12-30/pdf/2016-30246.pdf, 2017.
[2] “SAE ARP4761: Guidelines and Methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and
Equipment,” Standard, SAE International, 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096-001, 1996.
[3] “SAE ARP4754: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems,” Standard, SAE International, 400 Commonwealth
Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096-001, 2010.
[4] Moir, I., Seabridge, A., and Jukes, M., System Safety, chapter and pages, pp. 119–158. URL http://ebookcentral.
proquest.com/lib/gatech/detail.action?docID=1469444.
[5] Hasson, J., and Crotty, D., “Boeing’s safety assessment processes for commercial airplane designs,” 16th DASC. AIAA/IEEE
Digital Avionics Systems Conference. Reflections to the Future. Proceedings, Vol. 1, IEEE, 1997, pp. 4.4–1 – 4.4–7.
[6] Ericson, C. A., Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety, Wiley-Interscience, Hoboken, N.J., 2005.
[7] Saglimbene, M. S., “Reliability analysis techniques: How they relate to aircraft certification,” Annual Reliability and
Maintainability Symposium, IEEE, 2009, pp. 218–222.
[8] Caldwell, R. E., and Merdgen, D. B., “Zonal analysis: the final step in system safety assessment (of aircraft),” Annual Reliability
and Maintainability Symposium, IEEE, 1991, pp. 277–279.
[9] Bleu-Laine, M.-H., Bendarkar, M. V., Xie, J., Briceno, S., and Mavris, D. N., “A Model-Based System Engineering Approach
to Normal Category Airplane Airworthiness Certification,” AIAA Aviation Forum, Dallas, TX, 2019.
[10] Bendarkar, M. V., Xie, J., Briceno, S., Harrison, E. D., and Mavris, D. N., “A Model-Based Aircraft Certification Framework for
Normal Category Airplanes,” AIAA Aviation Forum, VIRTUAL EVENT, 2020. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2020-
3096.
[11] Washington, A., Clothier, R. A., and Williams, B. P., “A Bayesian approach to system safety assessment and compliance
assessment for Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol. 62, 2017, pp. 18 – 33. https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2017.02.003.
24
[12] “ASTM F3230-17: Standard Practice for Safety Assessment of Systems and Equipment in Small Aircraft,” Standard, ASTM,
West Conshohocken, PA, United States, 2017.
[13] Armstrong, M., “Identification Of Emergent Off-nominal Operational Requirements During Conceptual Architecting Of The
More Electric Aircraft,” Ph.D. thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2011.
[14] Bendarkar, M. V., Behere, A., Briceno, S. I., and Mavris, D. N., “A Bayesian Safety Assessment Methodology for
Novel Aircraft Architectures and Technologies using Continuous FHA,” AIAA Aviation 2019 Forum, 2019, p. 3123.
https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2019-3123.
[15] Kaplan, S., and Garrick, B. J., “On the quantitative definition of risk,” Risk analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1981, pp. 11–27.
[16] Foot, P., “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect,” Oxford Review, Vol. 5, 1967, pp. 5–15.
https://doi.org/10.5840/monist197659224.
[17] Jarvis Thomson, J., “The trolley problem,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 94, No. 6, 1985, p. 5.
[18] Thomson, J. J., “Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem,” The Monist, Vol. 59, No. 2, 1976, pp. 204–217.
[19] Allenby, K., and Kelly, T., “Deriving safety requirements using scenarios,” Proceedings Fifth IEEE International Symposium
on Requirements Engineering, IEEE, 2001, pp. 228–235.
[20] Ruijters, E., and Stoelinga, M., “Fault tree analysis: A survey of the state-of-the-art in modeling, analysis and tools,” Computer
Science Review, Vol. 15-16, 2015, pp. 29–62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosrev.2015.03.001.
[21] Kabir, S., “An overview of fault tree analysis and its application in model based dependability analysis,” Expert Systems with
Applications, Vol. 77, 2017, pp. 114–135.
[22] Lee, H.-J., and LEE, H.-W., “Method for assessing the electric power system reliability of multiple-engined aircraft,” Journal of
Aircraft, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1993, pp. 413–414.
[23] Hasan, S., Hemm, R., Houser, S., and Reveley, M., “Integrated Safety Benefits Analysis of NASA Aviation Safety Program
Technologies,” AIAA’s Aircraft Technology, Integration, and Operations (ATIO) 2002 Technical Forum, 2002, p. 5893.
[24] Hemm, R., Horio, B., and DeCicco, A., “Assessment of system safety risks for NextGen concepts and technologies,” 12th AIAA
Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations (ATIO) Conference and 14th AIAA/ISSMO Multidisciplinary Analysis and
Optimization Conference, 2012, p. 5547.
[25] Papathakis, K. V., Burkhardt, P. A., Ehmann, D. W., and Sessions, A. M., “Safety Considerations for Electric, Hybrid-Electric,
and Turbo-Electric Distributed Propulsion Aircraft Testbeds,” 53rd AIAA/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference, 2017.
https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2017-5032.
[26] Woodham, K. P., Graydon, P., Borer, N. K., Papathakis, K. V., Stoia, T., and Balan, C., “FUELEAP Model-Based System Safety
Analysis,” 2018 Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations Conference, 2018. https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2018-3362.
[27] Amendola, A., and Reina, G., “Event Sequences and Consequence Spectrum: A Methodology for Probabilistic Transient
Analysis,” Nuclear Science and Engineering, Vol. 77, No. 3, 1981, pp. 297–315. https://doi.org/10.13182/NSE81-A19840.
[28] Dominguez-Garcia, A. D., Kassakian, J. G., Schindall, J. E., and Zinchuk, J. J., “An integrated methodology for the dynamic
performance and reliability evaluation of fault-tolerant systems,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Vol. 93, No. 11,
2008, pp. 1628–1649.
[29] Borer, N., Claypool, I., Clark, D., West, J., Somervill, K., Odegard, R., and Suzuki, N., “Model-driven development of reliable
avionics architectures for Lunar Surface Systems,” 2010 IEEE Aerospace Conference, IEEE, 2010, pp. 1–21.
[30] Paté-Cornell, M., “Uncertainties in risk analysis: Six levels of treatment,” Reliability Engineering System Safety, Vol. 54, No. 2,
1996, pp. 95 – 111. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0951-8320(96)00067-1.
[31] Zaretsky, E., Hendricks, R. C., and Soditus, S., “Weibull-based design methodology for rotating aircraft engine structures,”
Report NASA/TM-2002-211348, NAS 1.15:211348, E-13091, NASA, June 2002.
[32] Jardine, A., Anderson, P., and Mann, D., “Application of the Weibull proportional hazards model to aircraft and marine engine
failure data,” Quality and reliability engineering international, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1987, pp. 77–82. https://doi.org/10.1002/qre.
4680030204.
25
[33] Armstrong, M., Garcia, E., and Mavris, D., “Aircraft Mission And System Failure Considerations For Functional Induction
Based Conceptual Architecture Design,” 27th International Congress of Aeronautical Sciences, Nice, France, 2010.
[34] Lam, H. T., and Szeto, K. Y., “Optimization of Reliability of Network of Given Connectivity using Genetic Algorithm,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1412.4218, 2014.
[35] Dezfuli, H., Kelly, D., Smith, C., Vedros, K., and Galyean, W., “Bayesian Inference for NASA Probabilistic Risk and Reliability
Analysis,” Tech. Rep. NASA/SP-2009-569, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2009.
[36] An, D., Choi, J., and Won, J., “Integrated Bayesian reliability analysis under input variable and metamodel uncertainties,” 51st
AIAA/ASME/ASCE/AHS/ASC Structures, Structural Dynamics, and Materials Conference 18th AIAA/ASME/AHS Adaptive
Structures Conference 12th, 2010, p. 2594.
[37] Banghart, M., Bian, L., Strawderman, L., and Babski-Reeves, K., “Risk assessment on the EA-6B aircraft utilizing Bayesian
networks,” Quality Engineering, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2017, pp. 499–511. https://doi.org/10.1080/08982112.2017.1319957.
[38] Bonis, A., “Bayesian Reliability Demonstration Plans,” 5th Annual Reliability and Maintainability Conference, 1966.
https://doi.org/10.2514/6.1966-25112.
[39] Youn, B., and Wang, P., “Bayesian Reliability Based Design Optimization under Both Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainties,”
11th AIAA/ISSMO Multidisciplinary Analysis and Optimization Conference, 2006. https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2006-6928.
[40] “Reactor safety study. An assessment of accident risks in US commercial nuclear power plants. Executive summary,” Tech. rep.,
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975.
[41] Guarro, S., “Risk assessment of new space launch and supply vehicles,” 11th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and
Management Conference and the Annual European Safety and Reliability Conference 2012, PSAM11 ESREL 2012, 2012, pp.
5157–5164.
[42] Guikema, S. D., and Paté-Cornell, M. E., “Bayesian analysis of launch vehicle success rates,” Journal of spacecraft and rockets,
Vol. 41, No. 1, 2004, pp. 93–102.
[43] Kelly, D. L., “Risk Analysis of the Space Shuttle: Pre-Challenger Bayeisan Prediction of Failure,” Tech. rep., Idaho National
Laboratory (INL), 2008.
[44] Lee, P. M., Bayesian statistics an introduction, 4th ed., Chichester, West Sussex ; Hoboken, N.J., 2012.
[45] Clarke, S., Redifer, M., Papathakis, K., Samuel, A., and Foster, T., “X-57 power and command system design,” 2017 IEEE
Transportation Electrification Conference and Expo (ITEC), IEEE, 2017, pp. 393–400. https://doi.org/10.1109/ITEC.2017.
7993303.
[46] Deere, K. A., Viken, S., Carter, M. B., Viken, J. K., Cox, D. E., Wiese, M. R., and Farr, N. L., “Computational Component
Build-up for the X-57 Maxwell Distributed Electric Propulsion Aircraft,” 2018 AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting, 2018, p.
1275.
[47] Puranik, T., Jimenez, H., and Mavris, D., “Energy-based metrics for safety analysis of general aviation operations,” Journal of
Aircraft, Vol. 54, No. 6, 2017, pp. 2285–2297.
[48] Puranik, T. G., “A Methodology for Quantitative Data-driven Safety Assessment for General Aviation,” Ph.D. thesis, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2018.
[49] Marco, A. D., Duke, E., and Berndt, J., “A General Solution to the Aircraft Trim Problem,” AIAA Modeling and Simulation
Technologies Conference and Exhibit, 2007. https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2007-6703.
[50] Schnulo, S. L., Chin, J., Falck, R. D., Gray, J. S., Papathakis, K. V., Clarke, S. C., Reid, N., and Borer, N. K., Development of a
Multi-Segment Mission Planning Tool for SCEPTOR X-57, chapter and pages. https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2018-3738.
[51] Schnulo, S. L., Hall, D., and Chin, J., “Further Development and Validation of NASA X-57 Maxwell Mission Planning Tool for
Mods III and IV,” AIAA Propulsion and Energy 2019 Forum, 2019. https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2019-4491.
[52] Survey of Ranges of Component Reliability Data for Use in Probabilistic Safety Assessment, No. 508 in TECDOC Series,
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Vienna, 1989. URL https://www.iaea.org/publications/763/survey-of-
ranges-of-component-reliability-data-for-use-in-probabilistic-safety-assessment.
26
[53] Generic Component Reliability Data for Research Reactor PSA, No. 930 in TECDOC Series, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY, Vienna, 1997. URL https://www.iaea.org/publications/5582/generic-component-reliability-data-for-
research-reactor-psa.
[54] Darmstadt, P. R., Catanese, R., Beiderman, A., Dones, F., Chen, E., Mistry, M. P., Babie, B., Beckman, M., and Preator, R.,
“Hazards Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of Four Concept Vehicle Propulsion Systems,”
Tech. Rep. NASA/CR-2019-220217, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2019.
[55] NTSB, “Auxiliary Power Unit Battery Fire Japan Airlines Boeing 787-8, JA829J,” Incident Report NTSB/AIR-14/01, National
Transportation Safety Board, Jan 7, 2013 2013. URL https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/pages/boeing_787.aspx.
[56] Mahar, D., Fields, W., and Reade, J., “Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data (NPRD-2016),” Tech. rep., Quanterion Solutions
Incorporated, 2015.
[57] “Historical Reliability Data for IEEE 3006 Standards: Power Systems Reliability,” 3006HistoricalData-2012 Historical
Reliability Data for IEEE 3006 Standards, 2012, pp. 1–303. https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2012.6745993.
[58] Cao, W., Mecrow, B. C., Atkinson, G. J., Bennett, J. W., and Atkinson, D. J., “Overview of Electric Motor Technologies
Used for More Electric Aircraft (MEA),” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, Vol. 59, No. 9, 2012, pp. 3523–3531.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIE.2011.2165453.
[59] Goron, G., Duca, R., Sarojini, D., Shah, S., Chakraborty, I., Briceno, S. I., and Mavris, D. N., “A Simulation-Based Framework
for Structural Loads Assessment during Dynamic Maneuvers,” 17th AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations
Conference, 2017, p. 3767.
[60] Duca, R., Sarojini, D., Bloemer, S., Chakraborty, I., Briceno, S. I., and Mavris, D. N., “Effects of Epistemic Uncertainty on
Empennage Loads During Dynamic Maneuvers,” 2018 AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting, 2018, p. 0767.
[61] Sarojini, D., Duca, R., Solano, H. D., Chakraborty, I., Briceno, S. I., and Mavris, D. N., “Framework to Assess Effects of
Structural Flexibility on Dynamic Loads Developed in Maneuvering Aircraft,” 2018 Aviation Technology, Integration, and
Operations Conference, 2018, p. 4147.
[62] NASA-LaRC, “X-57 Maxwell Simplified CRM v.4.4.1,” retrieved June 8, 2020, online: http://hangar.openvsp.org/vspfiles/408,
2013.
[63] NASA, “X-57 Mini-Poster,” retrieved November 16, 2020, online: https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/x-57-
litho-print-v4.pdf, 2020.
[64] Lanham, C., “Inertia Calculation Procedure for Preliminary Design,” Tech. rep., AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS DIV WRIGHT-
PATTERSON AFB OH, 1979.
[65] Drela, M., and Youngren, H., AVL 3.36 User Primer, MIT, Feb. 2017.
27
